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Prof. Dr. Sinsi
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Kurtuluş Savaşının Türk Dış Politikası(Abd Belgeleri)
RAPORUN ÖZGÜN METNİ
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SUBJECT: VIEWS OF NATIONALIST MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Monograph Rep’t
From: CONSTANTINOPLE (Nationalist Turkey)
No: 1315 Date: August 9, 1921
Replying to No: Date:
POLITICAL
(60) Domestic Politicizes
(61) Alien Policies
Lieutenant Robert S Dunn, USN, in a recent visit to Angora had an interview with Youssouf Kemal Bey, Mustapha Kemal’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, who during the war was Under Minister of Justice at Constantinople He was not an extremist of the Committee of Union and Progress
In the course of conversation with Lieutenant Dunn and in order to show that an initiative by the Turks for resumption of diplomatic relations had already been undertaken, Youssouf signified that Dr Emin Bey had been sent to Admiral Bristol He said that during Emin Bey’s visit both political and commercial projects had been discussed Lieutenant Dunn suggested that Admiral Bristol might approve of official political relations in the future and had been considering the advisability of recommending to Washington that an official United States representative should be sent to Angora Youssouf insisted that any such relations should be reciprocal, viz; that if an American representative were at Angora a Turkish representative should go to Washington He cited the request for the Angora Government by the United States which Mr MacDowell reported on
In pressing for reciprocal political and commercial representatives, Youssouf pointed out that any American trade in Anatolia would need protection from the political point of view He cited that any commercial troubles or disagreement might result in he dispatching of a destroyer to Samsoun to brign pressure which could easily be avoided if an American political representative were at Angora, and that wherever trade existed it presupposed a “Zone of Influence” politically Youssouf asked if a memorandum regarding a reciprocal trade and a political agreement could be made out He said he had already drawn up an agreement which Dr Emin Bey, had laid before Admiral Bristol, and understood that a meeting of American business-man had taken place at Constantinople at which both trade and politics had been discussed
When asked whether his people did not value the fourteen million dolars of American money coming into the country every year in payment for tabacco and that it seemed strange that his government was asking for closer commercial relations with Americans and at the same time doing all in its power to destroy them by deporting employees of American concerns, Youssouf immediately consented to see that orders were given that no more of these workers should be deported and that those who had been taken away should be returned, but added that any men against whom the police had already secured evidence would have to be deported He did not deny that the Samsoun authorities were rather irresponsible, that no coordination existed between them and Angora, and that the police were spy and mania mad and likely to manufacture evidence against inidividuals in order to promote their personal interests He cited that the Greeks had lately destroyed three or four Turkish villages between Samsoun and Amassia and charged that 300 Turks had been killed by Greeks at Ismid before the latter evacuated the town Regarding deportations by local authorities, he agreed that the ignorance of such local officials was general and deplorable
Youssouf Kemal Bey was asked as to what treaties his government and Moscow had concluded and if any further demands as reported had been made on Angora by the Bolsheviks He assured, emphatically, that the March 16th agrement was the only one yet entered into; that while it had not yet been ratified by the Grand National Assembly, the debate on it there was to begin soon and the treaty would surely be accepted He denied categorically that the Bolsheviks had demanded large economic concessions as a postscript to this treaty or that they had offered military aid provided they should be allowed to sovietize the six eastern vilayets, or that an agreement had been signed at Kars in May which Dr Nihad Bey at Trebizond had said that the new Russian Minister to Angora, M Natcheranov, was negotiating in the Caucasus He added that any concession of sovereignty in the six vilayets would be impossible as it would be against the National Pact He said that the Russians and Turks regarded themselves as friendly because they were neighbors He appreciated that the Russians were the first people who had recognized his government, as he put it, “extended the hand of friendship to us” His people were grateful for this, especially for the Russians having recognized the abolishment of capitulations
Youssouf stated that the Greek offensive was imminent and that the present was a critical hour for his country A Greek attack would be the result of their refusal to accept the new compromise of the Entente just made in Paris and presented to Athens by an Allied officer Youssouf stated that he did not know the nature of the compromise Youssouf led the conversation up to the “National Declaration” at the Sivas Conference–the so-called National Pact–for complete Turkish control within Anatolian frontiers where Moslems are the leading peoples He admitted the Turks defeat in the Great War; also that Turkey must be dismembered and new countries formed from it, Mesopotamia, Arabia, French Syria, Palestine, as Poland, Hungary, Yougo-Slavia, etc, were formed from the old Austrian Empire But he declared that this was punishment enough for Turkey and that just as Austria and Germany have been left in complete control of the Teutonic parts of their countries so Turkey must retain complete control of the Turkish part of hers It was not fair to treat Turkey worse than Austria-Hungary by dividing her up into “Zones of European Influence”, imposing forcing gendarmeries on her and parceling out her resources wholesale as concessions Youssouf stated emphatically that the Turks must get back Smyrna and Eastern Thrace unconditionally, without any compromise
The conversation progressed to the Greek question in general and the British attitude toward it regarding their evacuation of Constantinople and the other alternative of aiding the Greeks to the limit; General Harrington’s mission to London, the congress of British premiers and the Curzon-Briand conversations at Paris He said that it made no difference what was decided there; the Turkish position was fixed and unalterable Youssouf appeared to be a little ever-confident, if not arrogant, and when reminded that he must realize that if the British people over decided really to back the Greeks his government would be destroyed once and for all, it was noticeable that he made no direct specific charges of British aid to the Greeks either the battle of Inanou or at present but he stated that the Greeks had been supplied with officers and material, including tanks He said that England would continue to support Greece because of secret informal agreements between the two countries The conversation led to Bekir Sami’s activities at the London Conference
Youssouf stated that Bekir Sami Bey exceeded his authority He had plenipotentiary powers to sign reservations to the Sevres Treaty for submission to the Angora Parliament but they extended only to decisions of the London Conference Bekir Sami was quite right in accepting these reservations although the Great National Assembly could not accept them because they were contrary to the “National Pact” But he had no right to sign a separate treaty with France regarding Cilicia or the one with the Italians granting them commercial concessions and zones of influence The Italian zone established separately at London by him has been repudiated here by Parliament The error that really caused Bekir Sami Bey’s resignation was his signature to the French agreement about Cilicia Youssouf insisted that Bekir Sami was still a personal friend of his and a power in the Angora Government; also that he was not travelling in Europe officially at present but “for his health”
Regarding the exchange of British prisoners, Youssouf Kemal stated that Bekir Sami had also exceeded his authority here but it was a minor matter He was authorized to negotiate for their release en bloc only - the 100 odd Malta prisoners for the 22 odd Britishers (most of whom are really Greeks and Armenians who have served in the British Army) but he allowed the British to slip into the agreement a provision that the Maltarites adjudged guilty of certain crimes by British court should not be subject to exchange Hence, the slip-up, the refusal of the Turkish Assembly to accept the terms and the consequent British anger
In regard to the Bouillon Mission to Angora, Youssouf remarked that Bouillon was at Angora in the French treaty matter - not regarding control of the Adana railway He mentioned the Turkish counter proposals to Bekir Sami’s original agreement which had been submitted to General Gouraud, the ones which provide for French evacuation to within a few miles of Alexandretta, and the refusal to accept a French Gendarmerie Youssouf would not admit that the French had French had finally refused them He merely said “we have heard nothing about them since” He then went on quickly to say that Bouillon had come to Angora with new French proposals, as to their nature frankly he could not say, as they were until under consideration He seemed optimistic that the main differences with France would soon be settled
Youssouf Kemal Bey dwelt longest on the affair of Mustapha Saghir, the one subject he and all Turkish officials like to discuss and gloat over, since it hangs something “on” British political methods and confirms all their ideas about British repute for intrigue in the Near East He said that a blue book with photographs and copies of letters put in evidence at the trial and the whole trial proceedings was being produced in an English text Two points were put before Youssouf:
1) Are there any proofs beside his confession that Saghir was sent to Angora to negotiate the preliminaries for the assassination of Mustapha Kemal Pasha as his people charged?
2) Whether the Turks were justified or not in shooting him?
In regard to (1), his main proof lay in the confession which he admitted was made solely to save life and was repudiated at his execution Youssouf declared that the confession included that not only had Mustapha Saghir received in Constantinople instructions to inquire how Mustapha Kemal’s personal servants and cook were engaged, who took care of his tableware (with a view to poisoning him supposedly), but that he had actually made these inquiries in Angora and witnesses had testified to this Also that he had received from and sent to the Indian Independence Agent in Constantinople letters that showed the same thing and which will be produced in the brochure mentioned Youssouf would not admit that the execution was a diplomatic error He seemed very sure that Saghir was a practiced assassin because he had included the Afghan Emir business in his confession
At a second interview a few days later, Youssouf Kemal Bey, speaking about Russia, said that Russia had had her eyes on Constantinople for the last 500 year and it was conceded to her in a secret war treaty Youssouf said he knew that Russia wanted it but had no fear that she would get it, and that his people were properly safeguarded against Russian domination by provisions in the March treaty Youssouf admitted indirectly, after a long discussion, that the reason for friendship between his people and the Bolsheviks was because of their mutual interests in the Caucasus, and that the Turk did not want to have enemies in the north and east as they have in the west
Youssouf then talked of politics generally and emphasized that the Grand National Assembly was united on a single aim, the National “Pact” and that, therefore no parties could exist The “Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Eastern Roumelia” party which was organized just after the armistice to combat the old Unionist Part was a Liberal organisation He tacitly admitted that the CUP element is a lawless one and would like to return to power in the chief centers He expressed confidence that this would not happen, yet a certain apprehension beneath his words was detected
Youssouf admitted that he knew of the British effort at Berlin to get Talaat to Angora but declared he never would have been allowed to land on Nationalist soil He did not know Talaat had arranged at the San Remo Conference for the Angora delegates to be received at London in March He hinted that the British, instead of the Bolsheviks, were at the bottom of Talaat’s assassination He agreed that Enver Pasha had become a spectacular and adventurous character who no longer was a real factor in the Near East When asked whether Shukri Bey, just released from Malta, Minister of Instruction during the war at Constantinople and a bad CUP, would be given a job in the Angora Government, Youssouf answered rather scornfully that no such place would be found for him
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